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One justification for public support of higher education is that prospective students, particularly those
from underprivileged groups, lack complete information about the costs and benefits of a college degree.
Beyond financial considerations, students may also lack information about what they need to do academically
to prepare for and successfully complete college. Yet until recently, college aid programs have typically
paid little attention to students' information constraints, and the complexity of some programs can
exacerbate the problem. This chapter describes the information problems facing prospective students
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The economic rationale for public intervention in higher education finance rests on three 
potential market failures (Barr 2004). First, the social returns to higher education may exceed the 
private returns, thus justifying broad-based public subsidies. Second, private credit markets may 
not enable individuals to sufficiently borrow against future income to finance optimal 
educational investments, thus justifying public provision of (or at least public backing of) student 
loans.  Finally, young people – particularly those from disadvantaged backgrounds – may have 
incomplete information leading them to underestimate the benefits (or overestimate the cost) of 
higher education, thus justifying the provision of targeted grants to improve access.   
 
This third type of market failure has arguably increased in importance in recent years, as the net 
price of college (listed tuition minus grants) has become increasingly individualized.  For 
example, in the United States, trends in list prices and net prices have diverged since 2007 as 
more institutions adopt high-tuition, high-aid policies; only about one-third of full-time US 
students now pay the published list price (College Board 2011). Similarly, as other nations 
dramatically expand access to higher education, budgetary pressures push them towards an 
“Anglo-American” model of higher education with prices that vary both across institutions and 
across students (Barr 2004; Turner 2009).  At the same time, post-college earnings are also 
becoming more variable: studies in the United States have found that while the returns to a 
college degree have increased dramatically since 1980, wage dispersion within demographic and 
educational categories increased simultaneously (Autor, Katz & Kearney 2008; Lemieux 2006). 
 
The evidence discussed below suggests that while many students appear well aware of the 
benefits of postsecondary education—in some cases even overestimating expected earnings 
gains—they persistently overestimate costs and are uninformed about sources of potential aid. 
Beyond costs and benefits generally, students face an even larger informational challenge when 
it comes to comparing the costs and benefits of specific institutions—which can lead to a 
haphazard postsecondary choice process. Students, particularly those from disadvantaged groups, 
also receive mixed informational signals regarding academic expectations both prior to and after 
college enrollment.  
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Ironically, the design of financial aid policy in many cases seems to assume away these 
information constraints. Complex aid formulae, poor marketing, and cumbersome application 
procedures can make it difficult for students to ascertain their eligibility well in advance of the 
college-going decision; in many countries (including the United States) students typically cannot 
obtain concrete information about financial aid until after they have applied for and been 
accepted at a postsecondary institution.  As stated by Dynarski and Scott-Clayton (2006), 
“potential college students cannot respond to a price subsidy if they do not know it exists” (p. 
320). And if information barriers are particularly acute among the disadvantaged, the 
effectiveness of financial aid policy can be undermined substantially. 
 
In recent years, however, researchers and policymakers have approached a consensus regarding 
the importance of accounting for informational barriers in the design of financial aid policy 
(though reforms have in many cases fallen short of ideals): at a minimum, such policies should 
not exacerbate students’ confusion about costs. More ambitiously (and sometimes 
controversially), financial aid policy has also been leveraged to promote informed institutional 
choice and positive academic behaviors.  
 
This chapter proceeds as follows: first, I review the evidence regarding the nature and extent of 
students’ underlying information constraints; second, I discuss the role of financial aid policy in 
alleviating or aggravating these constraints; third, I discuss the implications for financial aid 
policy design. While this review draws primarily upon the US experience, evidence from other 
countries is included where available and applicable. I conclude with a discussion of caveats. 
 
STUDENTS’ UNDERLYING INFORMATION CONSTRAINTS 
This section will examine the types of underlying informational constraints students face that 
might be addressed via financial aid policies. First, how well informed are students with respect 
to the cost and benefits of postsecondary education generally? Second, how well informed are 
students with respect to the variation in costs and benefits across institutions and/or programs? 
Third, how well informed are students regarding what actions they need to take in order to 
prepare for and successfully navigate college?   
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Information about the benefits and costs of postsecondary education 
While econometricians have established the large returns to postsecondary schooling, students’ 
human capital investment decisions are driven by subjective perceptions rather than actual 
returns (Manski 1993). While only a handful of studies have examined students’ perceived 
benefits from postsecondary education, what evidence is available suggests that at least in the 
US, undergraduates are aware of the substantial payoff to a college degree (Smith & Powell 
1990; Betts 1996; Dominitz & Manski 1996). For example, Betts (1996) surveyed 1,269 
undergraduates at the University of California, San Diego and found that while students’ beliefs 
about future wages were noisy (with median absolute errors of about 20 percent), their estimated 
wages were on average about 94 percent of actual wages.  
 
A survey of undergraduates, however, cannot address the concern that students with poor 
information will not attend in the first place. The data on high school students’ earnings 
expectations is even more sparse, but suggests they are no less aware of the benefits to college. 
Avery & Kane (2004) find that high school seniors accurately estimate or even overestimate the 
returns to college, though their sample includes only about 400 students from two high schools; 
Dominitz & Manski (1996) also find relatively accurate estimates among a convenience sample 
of 71 high school students.   
 
In contrast to students’ awareness of the benefits of postsecondary education, survey data 
consistently indicates widespread confusion about college costs. For example, a 1998 survey of 
the general public indicated that while 56 percent of respondents reported knowing “a lot or a 
good amount” about college costs, on average they overestimated tuition prices at public four-
year institutions by 212 percent and the total costs of attendance by 99 percent (Ikenberry & 
Hartle 1998). Average tuition and total costs at public two-year institutions were overestimated 
by 180 and 193 percent, respectively.  
 
Horn, Chen & Chapman (2003) confirm these findings with data from the National Household 
Education Survey: 1999, which surveyed a nationally representative sample of 7,910 adolescents 
and their parents about college costs. Results indicated that among 11
th and 12
th graders who 
planned to pursue postsecondary education, only 52 percent had obtained any information about  
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tuition fees, as had only 54 percent of their parents. Among those who either had obtained cost 
information or were willing to make an estimate (approximately 63 percent of students and 71 
percent of parents), students and parents overestimated the tuition costs of public four-year 
institutions by 65 and 80 percent respectively, and overestimated the tuition costs of two-year 
institutions by 240 and 153 percent, respectively.   
 
It is worth considering why it is that perceived prices are systematically too high, rather than 
merely noisy estimates of true prices. One hypothesis is that media reports on college costs may 
distort public perceptions by focusing on the highest-priced elite private institutions (Advisory 
Committee on Student Financial Assistance, 2005).
1  This hypothesis is supported by evidence 
that the public overestimates prices at private four-year institutions by “only” 30 to 40 percent 
(Ikenberry & Hartle 1998), while Horn, Chen & Chapman (2003) find estimates within one to 12 
percent of actual averages for 11
th and 12
th graders (and their parents) who plan to attend such 
schools.  
 
The evidence also suggests that socioeconomically disadvantaged families face greater 
information barriers regarding college costs and benefits.  Ikenberry & Hartle (1998) found that 
low-income individuals and minorities were the most uninformed about the costs of college and 
the most likely to believe they could not afford to attend. Betts (1996) found that college students 
from low-income families tended to estimate lower payoffs to a college degree than did other 
students.
2 Horn, Chen, & Chapman (2003) found that both self-reported cost awareness and the 
ability to accurately estimate costs were positively and significantly related to parental education 
and household income. Grodsky & Jones (2007) confirm that disadvantaged families are less 
likely to be cost-aware and have noisier estimates of college costs, when they are willing to 
provide them (though they find that the average overestimate is fairly uniform by socioeconomic 
status). Finally, in a small survey of roughly 400 high school seniors, Avery & Kane (2004) 
found that students at high- and low-SES high schools similarly overestimated both the costs and 
                                                 
1 See, for example, “Those Scary College Costs,” by Tom Morganthau and Seema Nayyar, Newsweek, April 29, 
1996, p. 52, or “Most Expensive Colleges 2011: College Costs Reach New Highs,” BusinessWeek, October 25, 
2011, http://images.businessweek.com/slideshows/20111025/most-expensive-colleges-2011/.  
2 Students were explicitly asked to estimate national averages for graduates in various fields, rather than to report 
their own personal wage expectations.  
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benefits of attending college, but that students at low-SES high schools were only half as likely 
to believe they “definitely” would be able to afford college (37 percent versus 76 percent). 
 
Evidence from other countries 
There is no reason why the pattern of findings from the US – that students have good 
information about benefits, but dramatically overestimate costs – should necessarily extrapolate 
to other contexts.  Evidence from a recent survey of 1,055 randomly selected adult Canadians 
finds similar overestimates of average tuition (with mean estimates 107 percent above actual 
prices), but also finds that respondents also underestimate the return to a university degree by a 
factor of five (Usher 2005).  In the developing world context, Jensen (2010) finds that eighth-
grade boys in the Dominican Republic substantially underestimate the returns to secondary 
school. On the other hand, Nguyen (2008) finds that among parents of fourth-graders in 
Madagascar, perceptions of returns are noisy but centered around observed averages, and 
Attanasio & Kaufman (2009) find that Mexican youth either accurately estimate or overestimate 
returns to high school and college depending on how earnings expectations are elicited. 
 
Information about particular institutions 
Classical economic theory implies that an abundance of choice can never be a bad thing, and in 
the US, “[n]o nation in the world offers as much choice to potential undergraduates” (Goldin & 
Katz 2008: 254). Recent work in psychology, marketing and behavioral economics, however, 
presents compelling evidence that there can be a “dark side of choice” (Botti & Iyengar 2006) 
that can lead to decision mistakes, procrastination, and regret (for a review of these concepts 
applied to higher education, see Scott-Clayton 2011a). 
 
Indeed, if estimating the individual returns to postsecondary education is challenging, trying to 
figure out which particular institution offers the best return can be overwhelming. Boundedly 
rational individuals faced with a plethora of options may be unduly influenced by seemingly 
minor variations in how choices are structured and framed (Tversky & Simonson 1993; Bertrand, 
Karlan, Mullainathan, Shafir & Zinman 2005). For example, when a major testing company 
made a minor change to the process of sending admissions test scores to institutions – increasing 
the number of free “score reports” to four from three – it resulted in a disproportionately large  
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increase in the number of colleges to which students applied (Pallais 2009a).
3 Even academically 
elite students appear to be irrationally sensitive to the way in which admission and financial aid 
offers are framed: one study found that such students are more responsive to aid packages that 
include “scholarships” rather than “grants” of an equal size (Avery & Hoxby 2004). 
 
One adverse consequence of college choice confusion that is of particular concern to 
policymakers is the issue of “undermatching;” that is, that some low- and middle-income 
students may not attend the most selective institutions for which they academically qualify. 
Selectivity is often used as a proxy for college quality, and research indicates that it is associated 
with graduation rates, time to degree, and post-college earnings even after controlling for 
incoming student characteristics (Bowen, Chingos & McPherson 2009; Bound, Lovenheim & 
Turner 2009; Zhang & Thomas 2005).  
 
In the US, academically talented low-income students may face similar or even lower net costs at 
highly selective private (and public) institutions than at less selective ones (Avery & Turner 
2009).
4  Yet a recent study by Bowen, Chingos & McPherson (2009) using administrative data 
from North Carolina finds that nearly 60 percent of highly-qualified students in the bottom 
quartile of family income failed to attend the most selective institution for which they were 
eligible (as did 64 percent of those whose parents had no college education).  Similarly, a study 
of Chicago Public School students by Roderick, Nagaoka, Coca & Moeller (2009) found that 
fewer than half of students in academically advanced high school programs attended the most 
selective institution they could attend – and 20 percent of these students never even applied to a 
four-year college.  
 
Both qualitative and quantitative evidence suggests that this apparent undermatching is due to 
inadequate information and support throughout the college decision and financial aid application 
process (Roderick et al. 2009; Avery & Turner 2009). Students who severely overpredict net 








costs (or report not knowing net costs at all) are significantly less likely to apply to selective 
colleges and universities (Avery & Turner 2009). 
 
Students who are not well-informed about the costs and benefits of different types of institutions 
also may be vulnerable to misleading advertising or even outright fraud on the part of some 
institutions. For example, qualitative evidence suggests that the marginal college students 
targeted by community colleges and for-profit colleges often make their institutional selection 
haphazardly and fail to investigate more than one option (Rosenbaum, Deil-Amen & Person 
2006). It thus may be no coincidence that an undercover investigation of 15 for-profit colleges by 
the US Government Accountability Office (GAO) found that all 15 made “deceptive or 
questionable” statements to prospective applicants regarding program duration, costs, or 
graduation rates (US GAO 2010, p. 9). 
 
Information about academic preparation and expectations 
Finally, students may be poorly informed regarding what they need to do both before and during 
college in order to successfully complete a degree. Adelman (2006) finds that the academic 
intensity of a student’s high school coursework “counts more than anything else in precollegiate 
history in providing momentum toward completing a bachelor’s degree” (p. xviii). Yet high 
school graduation requirements are generally poorly aligned with requirements for college-level 
coursework (National Commission on the High School Senior Year 2001). Combine this 
misalignment with the limited availability of high school counselors and a reluctance of these 
counselors to “cool out” individuals’ college aspirations, and the result is that many students may 
never receive concrete, realistic guidance about the specific courses and grades they need to 
obtain in order not just to enter, but to do well in college (Rosenbaum, Deil-Amen, & Person 
2006). Moreover, low-income and minority students may have both fewer opportunities to obtain 
the academic preparation required for college and less “college knowledge” regarding what is 
expected in the first place (see review by Goldrick-Rab, 2010).  
 
This ambiguity about expectations may continue after college entry.  For example, a primary 
reason why students fail to graduate on time is that they fail to take enough course credits 
beginning in the first term of enrollment (Scott-Clayton 2011b). Yet despite concerns about  
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students’ lengthening time-to-degree (Bound, Lovenheim & Turner 2010), students may receive 
mixed messages about their expected course load.  For example, while a bachelor’s degree 
typically requires 120 credits to graduate in the US, financial aid regulations define a “full-time” 
student as one that takes 12 credits per semester, and a five-year degree plan has become 
standard at many “four-year” institutions (Scott-Clayton 2011c).  
 
THE ROLE OF INFORMATION IN FINANCIAL AID POLICY 
What is the role of financial aid policy in this informational context? The primary goal of 
financial aid policy is to lower the cost of college at the point of entry – whether to address the 
presence of social externalities, credit constraints, or information failures. A first principle of 
financial aid policy design might then be, “do no harm.”  Otherwise, even in the absence of any 
underlying information failures, lack of information about the availability of aid can become a 
problem on its own that may undermine the equity and effectiveness of financial aid policy. The 
role of information in financial aid policy as will be discussed below, using examples of grant 
and loan programs from the US and UK.  
 
Information and the effectiveness of grant aid 
Over thirty years of research in the US context demonstrates that large and transparent student 
grant programs can increase college enrollments (Long 2008). The best quasi-experimental 
evidence suggests that an additional $1000 of grant aid may increase college enrollment by 4 
percentage points (Deming & Dynarski 2009). Key studies showing positive effects include 
Dynarski’s (2003) study of the Social Security Student Benefit (SSSB) program, studies of the 
GI Bills (Stanley 2003; Bound & Turner, 2002), Kane’s (2007) study of the Washington, DC, 
Tuition Assistance Program, and several studies of state merit aid programs (Kane 2003; 
Dynarski 2004, 2008; Cornwell, Mustard, & Sridhar 2006; Scott-Clayton 2011b). 
   
An important and puzzling anomaly to the lesson above – which has been noted in prior reviews 
(Dynarski & Scott-Clayton 2006; Long 2008; Deming & Dynarski 2009) – is the relatively weak 
evidence regarding the Pell Grant program, which is the largest grant program in the US and 
which has provided need-based aid to low-income students since 1965. The broadest studies of 
the Pell Grant program, including an early study by Hansen (1983) and a subsequent study by  
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Kane (1996), find no detectable effect of the introduction of Pell Grants on college enrollments 
for eligible (low-income) populations.  
 
One hypothesis for the lack of overall impacts has been that the complexity of the Pell eligibility 
and application process obscures its benefits and prevents the program from reaching the 
individuals who need it most—those who are on the fence about college for financial reasons. In 
order to obtain a Pell Grant (or indeed any type of federal student aid, including work-study and 
student loans), students must complete the Free Application for Federal Student Aid (FAFSA), a 
process that remains daunting even after multiple attempts at simplification in recent years 
(Dynarski & Scott-Clayton 2006; Dynarski & Wiederspan 2012).  Students must assemble 
information about their own income and savings, their parents’ income and savings, their receipt 
of various other types of governmental assistance, and the amounts of various other types of 
income and liabilities (such as education tax credits claimed, child support paid or received, and 
other “money received or paid on your behalf”).
5 This information is based upon the prior tax 
year (e.g., 2011 for students entering college during the 2012-2013 academic year), and thus 
cannot be finalized until the spring of students’ last year of high school. 
 
This information, or some subset thereof, is then processed under one of eight different eligibility 
formulae, the choice of which depends upon family income, whether a student is classified as 
dependent or independent, whether or not he/she has children, whether anyone in the household 
received benefits from another federal means-tested program, and what type of federal income 
tax form the family is required to use.
6  At the end of this process, out comes an “expected 
family contribution” or EFC, which is described as “not the amount of money that your family 
must provide…[but rather] an index that colleges use to determine how much financial aid you 
would receive if you were to attend their school.”
7  Students must then wait for schools to 
contact them with details of their aid package. 










The consequences of this system include not just the compliance costs of assembling 
information, filling out forms, and following up with inquiries. The complexity of the process 
and lack of transparency in the eligibility determination process means that students and their 
families have little idea how much aid they will receive until far along in the college decision 
process.  The so-called “marginal student” who is the primary target of need-based financial aid 
may passively decide against college before ever learning about their aid eligibility. As described 
in Dynarski & Scott-Clayton (2006), it is difficult for students to respond to a subsidy they do 
not know about. The lack of information about available aid is acute: a recent national survey of 
600 young Americans aged 26 to 34 found that fewer than 3 in 10 individuals without a college 
degree had any idea what a FAFSA is (Johnson, Rochkind & Ott 2011).  
 
In contrast to the Pell Grant program, the programs that have demonstrated positive impacts tend 
to have simple, easy-to-understand eligibility rules and application procedures. This includes the 
SSSB program, GI Bills, and state merit aid programs. For example, in the case of the SSSB 
program, students were already receiving the benefits in high school, so they were aware of the 
value of the benefit. They then would receive a letter indicating that they would need to enroll in 
college full-time in order to continue receiving the benefit after they turned 18 (Dynarski 2003). 
In the case of US state merit aid programs, the scholarships simply cover “tuition and fees” at in-
state public institutions, or provide a fixed dollar amount of grant aid, for students with a grade 
point average (GPA) and/or college admissions test score above a certain cutoff (Dynarski 2004). 
Applications for these state programs are often one page in length or less, collecting primarily 
demographic information.  
 
Perhaps because of their simple design, students appear to be well-informed about state merit aid 
programs well in advance. For example, nearly half of Georgia middle-school students and 
nearly seventy percent of high school students could without prompting name that state’s 
program, the HOPE scholarship, as a source of college aid (Brackett, Gordon & Henry 1999).  
About half of students and two-thirds of their parents could name the primary benefit (free 
tuition) and requirement (3.0 GPA) of the program. 
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Note that two studies that have found evidence of positive effects of Pell Grants examined 
populations that may be less information-constrained than other prospective students. Seftor and 
Turner (2002) find positive effects of Pell Grants for older “nontraditional” students and 
Bettinger (2004) finds weak suggestive evidence of positive effects on college persistence for 
those already enrolled. Both findings are consistent with a story in which information and 
experience with bureaucracy is important: older individuals may have learned about the Pell 
program over time, and continuing students may learn about the program once they enroll in 
school. Those who have recently graduated from high school but not yet enrolled may be the 
least informed and least equipped to figure out the process. 
 
A recent experimental study by Bettinger, Long, Oreopoulos, & Sanbonmatsu (2009) provides 
dramatic evidence that the complexity of financial aid applications can itself become a 
significant barrier to college access.  In the experiment, low-income families who visited a tax-
preparation center were randomly assigned to one of three groups: 1) a “full treatment” group 
who received both personalized information about eligibility for financial aid as well as personal 
assistance with completing and submitting the FAFSA; 2) an “information-only” group that 
received personalized information about financial aid eligibility but no application assistance; 
and 3) a control group that received a brochure with general information about college costs, 
financial aid, and the value of going to college.   
 
The full treatment, which took less than 10 minutes and cost less than $100 per participant, 
increased immediate college entry rates by 8 percentage points (24 percent) for high school 
seniors and 1.5 percentage points (16 percent) among independent participants with no prior 
college experience.  After three years, participants in the full treatment group had accumulated 
significantly more time in college than the control group. Impacts on actual financial aid receipt 
were even larger.  
 
Information and the effectiveness of loan aid 
If complexity is a barrier to the effectiveness of grant programs, it is almost surely an even 
greater obstacle when it comes to student loans.  In the US, federal student loan eligibility is 
processed under the same system as for Pell Grants, utilizing the same FAFSA application and  
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overlapping eligibility formulae. But unlike Pell Grants, students are not automatically offered 
the full federal loan for which they are eligible; individual institutions have discretion on whether 
and how federal loans are incorporated into aid packages.  Some institutions choose not to offer 
any students federal loans or downplay their availability, a practice that appears more common at 
community colleges (Burdman 2005). Thus, students cannot know for sure what loan assistance 
will be offered until after they have been accepted and received financial aid award letters from 
each institution. 
 
Even once offered a student loan, students may struggle to digest all of the information required 
simply to describe the terms of the loan, let alone to evaluate whether and how much they should 
optimally borrow. Students need to know not just the size of the loan, but the interest rate, 
whether that rate is fixed or variable, whether interest accrues while the student is enrolled, when 
repayments begin, how repayments are calculated, and what protections are available should the 
student earn less than expected after graduating or otherwise leaving college. In the US, several 
of these loan features can vary across students depending upon income and family size (both at 
the time of loan origination, and during repayment), loan size, field of study and/or career, and 
the year in which the loan was originated.
8 Moreover, in the US, students have multiple 
repayment options including a standard ten-year mortgage-style repayment plan, an extended 
repayment plan, a graduated repayment plan, an income-contingent repayment (ICR) plan, and a 
new income-based repayment (IBR) plan initiated in 2009.
9 
 
Combine this with uncertainty regarding how much students expect to earn after finishing their 
schooling, and it can be extremely difficult to estimate in advance the repayment burden and risk 
associated with a given loan amount. Moreover, many prospective students will have little if any 
experience with such complicated financial contracts; because of this inexperience young people, 
particularly those from low-income families, are prone to making financial mistakes (Agarwal, 
Driscoll, Gabaix, & Laibson 2008; Lusardi, Mitchell, & Curto 2010).  









Debt aversion – the reluctance to borrow even when doing so would enable an investment with 
high expected returns – may result in part from confusion about loan terms. Debt-averse students 
may simply follow a quasi-rational rule-of-thumb to avoid financial transactions that they do not 
understand. Qualitative evidence from the US and UK suggests that low-income, minority, and 
first-generation students may be particularly wary about debt (Callender & Jackson 2005; 
Burdman 2005). 
 
Confusion may also help explain why only about 8 percent of borrowers opt into the ICR/IBR 
plans.
10 While these plans may offer significantly lower monthly payments, their calculation is 
more complex compared to a fixed standard repayment amount and necessitates an annual 
documentation of income and family size.
11 Students also must proactively opt into such plans; 
the default is the 10-year fixed repayment schedule. Materials provided to help students evaluate 
their repayment options emphasize that cumulative payments will be much larger when payment 
periods are extended, essentially assuming a zero discount rate (Chapman 2006). Overall, studies 
of the older ICR plan conclude that the low take-up is due to poor explanation and marketing, 
with less than a third of students aware the plan existed and an even lower proportion of financial 
aid advisors reporting that they understood the option well (Chapman 2006; Schrag 2001). 
 
Unlike with grants, there are not enough studies of the effectiveness of student loans to 
determine how simplicity and transparency may mediate their impact. Dynarski (2005) finds 
suggestive evidence of positive effects of student loan expansions in the U.S. in the early 1990s 
on college attendance, but the estimates are not highly robust to specification checks. Findings 
from the non-experimental literature “can at best be described as mixed” (Heller 2008, p. 46), 
perhaps because studies are inconsistent in whether they compare loans to grants, other types of 
aid, or to no aid at all. Based on the non-experimental evidence, Heller (2008) concludes that 








college enrollments are not as sensitive to loans as to grants. But since they also cost less, it 
remains unclear whether loans may still be cost-effective compared to grants. 
 
What is clear is that students do not like holding loans. An experiment by Field (2009) finds 
strong evidence of a pure distaste for loans among law school students. Admitted students at one 
school were randomly assigned to receive either (1) a public service scholarship which would 
convert to a loan if students did not pursue public service after graduation, or (2) a loan which 
would be forgiven if students decided to pursue public service after graduation. The two 
treatments were financially equivalent, yet framing the program as a loan which could be 
forgiven was much less effective in inducing students to public service than a grant which might 
convert to a loan. 
 
While government-backed student loans have long been a standard component of higher 
education finance in the US, they are comparatively new in the UK but growing rapidly. First 
introduced in 1990, student loans expanded after major policy changes in 1998 and 2004 
(Callender & Jackson 2005). This expansion is expected to continue as tuition fees continue to 
rise; for 2012-13 some institutions will be able to charge as much as £9,000, up from £3,375 for 
2011-12, and students will be able to borrow the full amount of tuition if needed as well as 
additional amounts for maintenance.
12  
 
Given the issues discussed above, it is no surprise that the increasing reliance on student loans 
has raised concerns in the UK.  Callender & Jackson (2005) find that disadvantaged students are 
more likely to be debt averse (as measured by survey questions about debt attitudes) than other 
students, and that debt aversion was predictive of students’ decision not to attend university even 
after controlling for other factors.  
 
The new system of student financing in the UK, while certainly more complicated than the 
previous tuition-free system, would appear to have several advantages over the US system in 
terms of simplicity and transparency. First, while tuition charges and the mix of student aid may 
vary across institutions and individuals, no student is required to pay tuition charges up front 
                                                 
12 See “Student Finance: University and higher education” at www.direct.gov.uk.   
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regardless of their financial situation because loan limits are pegged to tuition fees (in the US, 
federal loans for dependent undergraduates are limited to $5,500 to $7,500 per year, with a 
cumulative cap of $31,000, regardless of actual tuition charges).
13 Second, all loan repayments 
are determined under a simple income-contingent formula (currently 9 percent of income above 
£21,000). Finally, the student loan system is integrated with the tax system so repayments are 
calculated and deducted automatically. 
 
Yet the UK system far from eliminates the problem of information failures. Given the relatively 
new reliance on loan financing, students and their families (particularly those from low-income 
backgrounds) appear to be wary about how the loan system works and whether the debt will be 
manageable (Callender & Jackson 2005). Moreover, a study by Adnett & Tlupova (2008) found 
that higher education entrants were much less informed about tuition fees and available aid than 
they believed they were. Over a third of entrants did not know whether they would qualify for a 
bursary (institutional grant). Moreover, entrants from non-white ethnicities were more than twice 
as likely to report feeling poorly informed about student finance. 
 
Given the increasing reliance on student loans in both the UK and US, a critical question for 
future research is how sensitive students are to the specifics of how loans are structured and 
framed. Are there ways to make loans more attractive and less risky for students, without 
drastically increasing costs? For example, the cost of a loan program is greatly affected by the 
interest rate that is charged and whether interest accrues while students are still enrolled in 
school, yet there is evidence from other contexts that individuals do not give such details as 
much weight as they should when making savings and borrowing decisions (Benartzi & Thaler 
2007). Similarly, with income-contingent repayment schemes, it is unclear how students weight 
either the income disregard or the income assessment rate in their decisions about borrowing. If 
loan schemes cannot be made more comprehensible to students, any subsidies incorporated into 
loan programs may be ineffectual. Students may be more responsive to an aid package that 
includes an upfront grant and an unsubsidized loan, rather than to a package with the same 
present discounted value but including only subsidized loans.  





IMPLICATIONS FOR FINANCIAL AID POLICY DESIGN 
Identifying and addressing informational barriers can, at a minimum, help ensure that the 
impacts of government grant and loan policies are not watered down by confusion and 
uncertainty. There is widespread agreement among researchers and policymakers in the US 
regarding the need for simplicity, transparency, and predictability in financial aid (ACSFA 2005; 
Dynarksi & Scott-Clayton 2006; Long 2008; Rethinking Student Aid Group 2008). These 
principles have also been emphasized by the Office for Fair Access in the UK when providing 
guidance to institutions on best practices relating to student financial assistance (OFFA 2009). In 
this section, I briefly summarize the key informational principles that support financial aid 
effectiveness. I then discuss how financial aid policy can be leveraged further to address 
additional underlying information constraints – for example, by incorporating incentives to 
promote positive student (or institutional) actions. Finally, I evaluate whether purely 
informational interventions might achieve the same goals. 
 
The basics: simplicity, transparency, and predictability 
The body of evidence described above suggests that the most effective grant programs are the 
ones that are simple, both in terms of eligibility determination and application logistics. 
Simplicity is easier to attain if the aid schedule is pegged to meaningful amounts (such as 
“tuition and fees”), and if eligibility is based on a limited number of criteria. While policymakers 
and financial aid professionals often worry that simplifying eligibility criteria will lead to 
inaccurate identification of needy students, Dynarski & Scott-Clayton (2006) show that this 
concern is unwarranted in the case of US Pell Grants because only a handful of financial factors 
drive the need calculation.  
 
Although almost no one opposes simplification in theory, simplification in practice can be 
surprisingly difficult. For example, recent efforts to simplify the FAFSA in the US led to the 
removal of about two dozen application questions, but another dozen have been added; also, a 
new option to electronically import financial information directly into the FAFSA from the tax 
system can only be used by a small subset of applicants (Dynarski & Wiederspan 2012). Political 
realities also suggest that it is harder to simplify an existing program than it is to design a simple  
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one in the first place, because simplification necessarily creates some perceived winners and 
losers (Dynarski & Scott-Clayton 2007). 
 
Transparency means that students can easily understand what they need to do to qualify and what 
they will get if they do. Simplicity also facilitates transparency, but the two are not necessarily 
equivalent. For example, the FAFSA experiment described above (Bettinger et al. 2009) 
dramatically simplified the aid application process for those in the full treatment group, but 
underlying this simplified process remained an enormously complex eligibility calculation. Even 
after learning their aid eligibility, students may have no idea what made them eligible (and thus 
what might make them eligible or ineligible in subsequent years). Similarly, an aid system that 
comprises many simple niche programs may lack transparency overall regarding who is eligible 
for what.  
 
The concept of transparency might further be extended to include the concept of salience: what 
does the program mean to students and their families? Salience can be an important factor in 
program participation (Bertrand, Mullainathan & Shafir 2006). Programs that lack transparency 
may have little salience, such that even when information is conveyed it fails to “stick.” Further, 
programs that trigger positive student identities of merit and achievement may have greater 
salience (and thus greater public support) than those triggering negative identities of poverty and 
need (Dynarski 2004). This is one reason why institutions in the UK have been advised to “avoid 
dwelling too much on ‘financial hardship’ when describing bursaries as some students may 
find this off-putting” (OFFA 2009: 6). 
 
Finally, a critical component in the design of effective aid policy relates to early notification and 
predictability. Students and their families should be able to predict their college costs several 
years in advance, rather than making them wait until after admission to learn their eligibility. 
Students who are unsure of their ability to afford college may not take adequate steps to prepare 
academically while they are still in middle and high school. Without early notification and 
predictability, there are thus limits to the impact of simplifications that occur only at the margin 
of college application (such as the application assistance that occurred in the FAFSA 
experiment). One factor that has presented a barrier to early notification in the US is the reliance  
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on the prior year’s tax information in eligibility calculations: for example, in order to apply for 
aid for the 2012-13 academic year, a student needs 2011 tax information that may not be 
finalized until April 2012. Using tax information from the prior-prior year (e.g. 2010 in this 
example), however, would enable aid to be calculated a full year earlier and would result in very 
few changes to individuals’ eligibility status (Dynarski & Wiederspan 2012).  
 
What else can be done via financial aid policy? 
Leveraging financial aid policy to promote institutional accountability and informed choice 
In the US, federal financial aid policy has long been used as a lever to require institutions to 
provide more information about costs of attendance, available aid, and application procedures to 
prospective students (see 20 USC Sec. 1092). The Student Right to Know Act
 of 1990 further 
required all institutions participating in federal financial aid programs (known as Title IV 
funding) to calculate and disclose graduation rates among full-time degree-seeking students.  
 
But just because institutions must disclose this information does not mean that students or their 
families can easily find it, or that they know what to do with it. Indeed, many of these 
informational requirements predate the studies, described above, finding informational barriers to 
be a significant problem. This should temper expectations regarding the likely impact of more 
recent disclosure requirements (e.g., in October 2011 all Title IV-participating institutions were 
required to post net price calculators on their websites). In the UK, the Office for Fair Access 
(OFFA) has advised institutions that financial aid information should be actively promoted 
among potential students, in light of survey evidence that many students do not seek this 
information out because they do not know where to look (OFFA 2009). 
 
Leveraging financial aid policy to promote academic achievement 
Financial aid programs can be designed to address information problems on multiple levels.  For 
example, a number of state-level programs in the US tie college scholarships to high school 
achievement, thus sending students early signals of what is expected of them beyond simply 
earning a diploma. In Tennessee, where students could receive up to $3,000 per year in aid if 
they met GPA and test score requirements, students’ test scores rose significantly after the  
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introduction of the program (Pallais 2009b).
14 A few states have so-called “early commitment” 
programs in which financial aid is committed to prospective students early in high school or even 
middle school, on the condition that students also commit to follow through on specified 
academic and behavioral requirements such as taking a certain set of courses, earning a certain 
GPA, and staying out of legal trouble (Heller 2006). While there have been no experimental or 
quasi-experimental studies of these programs, one carefully controlled study of Indiana’s 
Twenty-First Century Scholars Program suggests that they significantly improve both students’ 
aspirations and actual enrollment (St. John, Musoba, Simmons, Chung, Schmit & Peng 2004).  
 
Similarly, financial aid programs that incorporate incentives for college achievement appear to 
be particularly effective, though the impact may be driven by motivational mechanisms rather 
than by improved information per se. For example, Brock and Richburg-Hayes (2006) find 
strong evidence that performance-based scholarships increase GPAs and persistence in 
community colleges, while Angrist, Lang, and Oreopoulos (2009) find weaker evidence at a 
large college in Canada (both studies were randomized experiments).
15  A quasi-experimental 
study by Scott-Clayton (2011b) of West Virginia’s PROMISE scholarship, which includes 
stringent requirements for annual renewal, finds that the program significantly increased 
graduation rates. The scholarship increased GPAs and credits completed in the first three years 
of college, but in the last year of the scholarship—while students are still receiving the money 
but no longer facing the minimum requirements—the program’s effect disappears. This suggests 
that while merit-based aid may convey important information about expectations, they may need 
to provide students with concrete motivation, not just information, in order to be effective. 
 
Can purely informational interventions achieve the same goals? 
To the extent informational constraints are a barrier, it is conceivable that purely informational 
interventions might impact postsecondary access without requiring an overhaul of financial aid 
policy.  The evidence on this proposition is somewhat mixed, however. The Bettinger et al. 
(2009) experiment described above also finds that the personal application assistance included in 
the full treatment was instrumental to the overall impact: they find no impact of only providing 
                                                 
14 The study finds that the increases in test scores are too large to be explained simply by increases in re‐testing. 
15 They find significant effects of a performance-based scholarship, but only for females who received additional 
services in addition to the financial incentive. There were no significant effects for the full sample.   
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participants with individualized information about aid eligibility. This important finding suggests 
that there are limits to the impact of providing information alone. Nonetheless, it does not rule 
out the potential for purely informational interventions to work in other contexts.  For example, 
is possible that informational interventions may have a greater impact when targeted to students 
earlier in high school, when delivered by counselors (or teachers or even peers) with whom 
students have an existing relationship, or when accompanied by additional information about 
how to apply for aid or where to turn with questions (rather than only information about potential 
eligibility).  Finally, it is worth noting that the control group in the Bettinger et al. (2009) also 
received some information about college costs and financial aid that they may not have had 
before; it is possible that this may have had an independent impact and that personalizing the 
information simply provided no additional impact. 
 
A small experiment conducted by Oreopoulos & Dunn (2011) in low-income Canadian high 
schools finds some evidence that information alone can change educational aspirations when 
presented in an interactive, engaging manner. Study participants filled out a survey on 
educational aspirations and financial aid awareness. Half were then randomly assigned to view a 
multi-media web page, including a short video and a financial aid calculator.  The video, which 
was professionally designed and targeted to a youth audience, provided information about the 
benefits of postsecondary education and how financial aid could help defray the costs. Students 
could print out the results of the financial aid calculator along with information about how to 
apply.   
 
Three weeks later, both groups were surveyed again. The treatment group had significantly 
increased their educational expectations and were significantly more likely to believe they would 
qualify for a grant. The pattern of impacts was most consistent amongst the students with the 
lowest baseline educational expectations.  The study did not examine actual postsecondary 
outcomes; however, for the low-expectations group the treatment did increase the proportion 
who requested additional information about specific institutions at the end of the second survey. 
 
Evidence indicates that purely informational interventions may be particularly impactful in the 
developing world, where information barriers among the disadvantaged may be particularly  
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acute. For example, in a field experiment by Jensen (2010) in the Dominican Republic, eighth 
grade boys in randomly selected schools were given information on average earnings for middle-
aged men with different levels of education.  Six months later, these students had significantly 
increased their perceptions of the returns to schooling, and over the next four years, these 
students completed 0.20 more years of school than their randomly-selected counterparts in the 
control group. Similarly, a field experiment conducted by Nguyen (2008) in primary schools in 
Madagascar found that providing parents with accurate information about returns to education 
led to a significant increase in their children’s test scores.
16  
 
CONCLUDING CAVEATS:  
LIMITATIONS ON THE ROLE OF INFORMATION CONSTRAINTS 
Two caveats to the discussion above are warranted.  First, work in psychology and behavioral 
economics has illuminated a realm of constraints on optimal decision-making that go beyond the 
purely informational, including bounded rationality as well as bounded self-control (see Scott-
Clayton [2011a] for a more in-depth application of behavioral economic concepts to higher 
education policy). Even with perfect information, individuals may struggle to make good use of 
it if their own preferences are unstable (Tversky & Simonson 1993) or if the complexity of the 
analysis required induces cognitive overload (Agarwal, Driscoll, Gabaix, & Laibson 2008). And 
even if individuals know what they want to do, they may delay or avoid taking action because 
they think it will be easier in the future (Laibson 1997), they want to avoid the regret associated 
with closing off alternatives (O’Donoghue & Rabin 2001), or they want to avoid “hassle factors” 
(Bertrand, Mullainathan, & Shafir 2004). Thus, while poor information may exacerbate many of 
these problems, perfect information does not necessarily eliminate them. Indeed, there is 
evidence that few individuals actively decided against going to college; instead, they have high 
aspirations but simply fall off the path to college by failing to take the specific actions required 
to attend (Avery & Kane 2004). This may help explain the failure of the purely informational 
treatment in the FAFSA experiment (Bettinger et al. 2009).   
 






Second, while students’ information constraints appear to present a serious obstacle to optimal 
educational decision-making, they are far from the only barrier to postsecondary access. Credit 
constraints appear to have increased in importance in the US over the past thirty years as costs 
have risen and aid has stagnated (see Lochner & Monge-Naranjo [2011] for a recent review of 
the evidence regarding credit constraints).  Inadequate academic preparation is also a critical 
barrier (Greene & Foster 2003). More broadly, it can be difficult to identify the separate effects 
of informational constraints because individuals who are financially or academically constrained 
may rationally devote less time and effort to learning about college costs, benefits, and 
requirements (Grodsky & Jones 2007).  
 
Notwithstanding these caveats, information constraints remain an important consideration for 
policymaking for at least two reasons. First, they can potentially be addressed at low cost, 
particularly if they are acknowledged early in the policy design process rather than after the fact. 
Second, if unaddressed, they can potentially undermine the effectiveness of even very large 
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